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COMMENTS
ENGLISH-ONLY IN THE WORKPLACE: A NEW
JUDICIAL LENS WILL PROVIDE MORE
COMPREHENSIVE TITLE VII PROTECTION
Raechel L. Adams'
The United States has always been a country of immigrants, and peo-
ple from foreign countries continue to flood its borders today.' To many
immigrants, the United States embodies equal opportunity for all people
without regard to their ethnicity or culture Despite this image, anti-
immigrant sentiment has run rampant through neighborhoods and work-
places Such targeting of foreign nationals is possible as many identify
nationality through language.4 In addition, many Americans seek to
+ J.D. candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 272, 342-45 (1992) [here-
inafter Perea I] (observing America's history of cultural pluralism and citing, as a recent
example, the influx of immigrants of Hispanic and Southeast Asian origins).
2. Cf. MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 58-59 (1972) (discussing the pluralism that defines
American history); Stephen M. Cutler, Note, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin
Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1179 (1985) (emphasizing the value of cultural
pluralism in the United States, as exhibited by First Amendment doctrine).
3. See Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken
Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 297-99 (1989) (discussing the history of anti-
immigrant sentiment in the United States). Califa describes a recurring pattern of anti-
immigrant backlash running through American history generally following periods of in-
creased immigration. See id. In addition, he discusses groups that focus on restricting im-
migration from countries such as Mexico because they claim that the U.S. economy and
culture cannot sustain such immigration. See id. at 298-99; see also Perea I, supra note 1, at
275-76 (recognizing the Anglo-Saxon cultural dominance in the United States and ex-
plaining that many Americans' reaction to pluralism is a demand for assimilation, espe-
cially with respect to language).
4. See 1 RALPH FASOLD, THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF SOCIETY: INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIOLINGUISTICS 3 (1984) (explaining that members of a nationality identify and feel
united with those who share their language because language, culture, religion, and history
are the principal components of nationality). Joshua Fishman, asserting that language is
the quintessential symbol and value of ethnicity, views both ethnicity and language as so
fundamental to a societal identity that both are "absorbed via the mother's milk."
1327
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 47:1327
promote their own nationality by advocating laws declaring English the
official language In keeping with this movement to establish English as
the official language of the United States, or at least of individual states,6
many public and private employers have instituted "English-only rules"
in the workplace.8
JOSHUA A. FISHMAN ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ETHNIC REVIVAL:
PERSPEC7IVES ON LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY 9 (1985).
5. See Perea I, supra note 1, at 278-79. Perea describes the official English move-
ment as one that has sought to define American culture by making English the official
language. See id. at 278. Official English proponents advocate the idea that national unity
depends on a single language and that English symbolizes the true American culture. See
id. at 346-47. Although the movement has not succeeded in making English the official
national language, it has managed to influence many state legislatures to enact statutes
making English the official state language. See id. at 342; see also Califa, supra note 3, at
293-94 (stating that the public votes overwhelmingly in support of English as the official
language, but arguing that English as the official language is simply a tool to promote
prejudice).
6. See David T. Wiley, Note, Whose Proof?: Deference to EEOC Guidelines on Dis-
parate Impact Discrimination Analysis of "English-Only" Rules, 29 GA. L. REV. 539, 542
n.17 (1995) (citing laws in seventeen states declaring English the official state language).
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1901, amend. 509 (1990) (declaring English the official state lan-
guage); CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. III, § 6(b) (1986) (same); FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. II, §
9(a) (1988) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1-42 (Michie 1997) (same). The Ninth Circuit re-
cently found overbroad, and thus unconstitutional, a proposed constitutional article mak-
ing English the official language of Arizona. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official Eng-
lish, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the case but failed to reach the merits, hold-
ing instead that when the employee resigned the case became moot and the Ninth Circuit
had thus erroneously heard the case. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.
Ct. 1055, 1071, 1075 (1997).
7. This Comment primarily addresses the question of whether English-only rules in
the private sector constitute unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
8. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
the employer instituted a policy requiring employees to speak only English in connection
with work). The court in Spun Steak upheld the following English-only rule:
[I]t is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English will be spoken in
connection with work. During lunch, breaks, and employees' own time, they are
obviously free to speak Spanish if they wish. However, we urge all of you not to
use your fluency in Spanish in a fashion which may lead other employees to suf-
fer humiliation.
Id. at 1483; see also EEOC Decision 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1823
(1981) (finding cause for a charging party's allegation that the following rule discriminated
on the basis of national origin: "[W]hen you are on the payroll all conversation will be in
English. Either work and speak English or work and don't talk.").
Some employers have required more than just that employees speak English in connec-
tion with work. See Brief for Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at
4, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wynell, 95 F.3d 49 (5th Cir. 1996) (No.
95-20523); Brief for Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 4, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wynell, Inc., 91 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-
20419). In Wynell, the employer's personnel manual required that "all administrative
1328
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Many employees, however, feel disadvantaged as a result of these
"English-only rules," which require that employees speak only English in
the workplace at certain times during the work day.9 Thus, some em-
ployees have begun to challenge English-only rules in court." Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 (Title VII) is the federal vehicle 2
through which employees in the private sector challenge workplace dis-
crimination based on language. 3 Title VII prohibits discrimination
"against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."1
4
Plaintiffs challenge English-only rules under Title VII on the ground
that these rules divide employees on the basis of national origin." Plain-
transactions, supervision and direction of the children be spoken in the English language."
Id. The employer later expanded the rule to prohibit speaking Spanish on the premises,
including during lunch breaks, allowing employees to speak in a language other than Eng-
lish only if they needed to communicate with a non-English speaking employee. See id. &
n.4; see also Mirta Ojito, Bias Suits Increase Over English-Only Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 1997, at B1 (illustrating a trend of increased language-related lawsuits by discussing a
case in which the employer prohibited employees from speaking Spanish during breaks,
lunch, and within one city block of the office building).
9. See Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (involv-
ing the claim of a disk jockey of Hispanic origin who felt that complying with his em-
ployer's rule that he stop speaking Spanish would effectively take away his ethnic charac-
ter).
10. See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483 (meat workers challenged company policy
requiring that only English be spoken in connection with work); Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409
(discharged radio disk jockey challenged radio station's rule that he speak only English on
his radio show); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980) (Mexican American
lumber salesman challenged discharge for answering in Spanish a co-worker's question
that was asked in Spanish); Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921-22
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (employee challenged unofficial English-only rule when terminated for
speaking two words of Spanish outside context for which rule was designed).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Employees also may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
federal civil rights statute providing relief to plaintiffs who have been denied legal rights or
privileges under color of law.
13. See Wiley, supra note 6, at 545 (observing that the courts traditionally have ana-
lyzed English-only claims under Title VII).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
15. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 (Mexican American lumber salesman challenged Eng-
lish-only rule as discriminatory because it denied him the right to converse in the language
most familiar to him). In Gloor, the plaintiff argued that his language preference was
grounded in his national origin. See id. Other plaintiffs have alleged that English-only
rules discriminate on the basis of race. See Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752,
755 (D. Or. 1973) (characterizing a tavern's policy allowing only English to be spoken at
the bar as racial discrimination against Mexican Americans). Scholars concur, however,
that language restrictions are most closely linked to national origin discrimination. See
Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 819 (1994) [hereinafter Perea II] (analyz-
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tiffs claim that because of the inextricable connection between foreign
nationality and foreign language," English-only rules inevitably impact
people of foreign origin. 7 Unfortunately, little legislative history exists
to explain what Congress meant by the phrase "national origin discrimi-
nation" in Title VII.'8 Courts and scholars point to the following defini-
tion devised by Congressman Roosevelt, one of the drafters of Title VII,
as the only available definition of national origin: "the country from
which you or your forebears came. '"" This ambiguity and plaintiffs'
ing the legislative history of Title VII, which indicates that national origin was meant to
encompass language requirements in employment); Todd Kolarik, Note, Garcia v. Spun
Steak Co.: Disparate Impact Plaintiffs Challenging Speak-English-Only Rules Under a
"Hostile Environment" Theory Must Prove Actual Adverse Impact, 26 U. TOL. L. REV.
655, 680-82 (1995) (pointing out that the Ninth Circuit in Spun Steak agreed with the
EEOC and most courts and scholars by conceding that discrimination on the basis of lan-
guage constitutes national origin discrimination).
16. See Robert D. King, Should English Be the Law?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
1997, at 55, 58, 60-61 (analyzing the history of nationalism and language in several cultures
through the centuries, and recognizing that ethnic unity and cultural identification have
been and still are defined by language). The first sentence of the first chapter of a basic
sociolinguistics textbook reads:
When people use language, they do more than just try to get another person to
understand the speaker's thoughts and feelings. At the same time, both people
are using language in subtle ways to define their relationship to each other, to
identify themselves as part of a social group, and to establish the kind of speech
event they are in.
2 RALPH FASOLD, SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF LANGUAGE: INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIOLINGUISTICS 1 (1990). Fasold also discusses the "ethnography of communication,"
the sociolinguistic theory that postulates that language is closely tied to social and cultural
values. See id. at 39. For a linguistic perspective on the link between language and cul-
ture, see generally JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, The Sociology of Language, in READINGS IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1968); MURIEL SAVILLE-
TROIKE, THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF COMMUNICATION (2d ed. 1989).
17. See Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933,939 (E.D. Va. 1995) (bank
employees of Hispanic origin claimed national origin discrimination and harassment be-
cause they were afraid to speak their native language once the bank instituted an English-
only policy); see also Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 (adjudicating a claim of national origin dis-
crimination based on an employer's English-only policy). In Gloor, the plaintiff argued
that to deny an employee the right to speak the language he speaks most comfortably was
to deny him a privilege of employment. See id. The argument illustrates that English-only
rules affect those most comfortable with languages other than English differently from the
way they affect those most comfortable speaking English. See id A person's national ori-
gin naturally determines the language he feels most comfortable speaking. See id
18. See Perea II, supra note 15, at 821 (explaining that the debates preceding the pas-
sage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act included few references to national origin discrimination
because Title VII was primarily enacted to combat discrimination against African Ameri-
cans).
19. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89 (1973) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2549
(1964)). Espinoza represents one of the first judicial interpretations of the scope of the
phrase "national origin" as used in Title VII. In Espinoza, the Supreme Court addressed
whether national origin discrimination included discrimination based on citizenship. See
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challenges have inspired a body of case law that considers whether lan-
guage restrictions are a form of national origin discrimination.20 In addi-
tion, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently
issued a guideline on the issue.2' The guideline creates a presumption
that English-only rules in the workplace discriminate on the basis of na-
22tional origin.
As early as 1970, the EEOC provided examples of national origin dis-
crimination in a general guideline on national origin discrimination.23
Initially, however, the link between language and national origin was un-
id. at 92.
20. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
that Hispanic employees failed to assert a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
the employer's English-only policy violated Title VII because it had an adverse impact on
a protected group), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Jurado v. Eleven Fifty-Corp.,
813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding English-only order to be business related and
without discriminatory motive); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266, 270 (holding that employees' in-
ability to comply with an English-only rule does not render the rule discriminatory).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1997). The EEOC is responsible for the enforcement of Title
VII, including claims of employment discrimination on the basis of national origin. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994). National origin-based charges filed between fiscal years 1990
and 1996 accounted for approximately 11% of all charges filed with the EEOC. See The
EEOC and National Origin Discrimination Based on Language and Accent (EEOC Office
of Communications and Legislative Affairs), Feb. 1997, at 4. The EEOC has litigated
against private employers regarding English-only rules in Los Angeles, San Antonio, Mi-
ami, Phoenix, Houston, New York, and Baltimore. See id. Several of these cases have set-
tled out of court, and the employers have rescinded their English-only rules. See EEOC v.
American Red Cross, Civil Action No. DKC94-3050, at 3 (D. Md. Sept. 6, 1995) (settle-
ment agreement) (requiring employer to rescind its English-only rule); EEOC v. Brown
Derby Restaurant, Civil Action No. 92-2940 WMB (EEx) at 3-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23,1992)
(consent decree) (prohibiting defendant from enforcing English-only policy and awarding
employee $5,000 in backpay).
In recent years, the EEOC has begun to focus on language-related issues due to in-
creased charges in that area. See EEOC National Enforcement Plan, EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL (BNA) No. 209, at N:3061 (1996) [hereinafter EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL] (identifying the EEOC's litigation strategy based on community
needs). Indeed, the EEOC has identified language-related claims as a priority enforce-
ment issue in the EEOC National Enforcement Plan. See id. at N:3062. This document
sets forth priorities for the Commission's enforcement of civil rights statutes, based on
public policy. See id. at N:3602 to N:3603.
22. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
23. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 421
(1970) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1). This guideline stated that the EEOC would scruti-
nize the use of the following: tests in English where English language was not essential to
the particular job; denial of equal employment opportunity to people associated with peo-
ple of foreign origin; denial of equal employment opportunity to people associated with
certain organizations that promoted "the interests of national groups"; and denial of equal
opportunity to people with names, heights, and weights associated with people of foreign
origin. See id.
19981 1331
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clear. For example, one court looked to the language of Title VII for a
definition of national origin discrimination and insisted that the omission
of "language" in the statutory definition meant that a discrimination
claim could not be premised on foreign language.24 The court pointed
out, however, that it was ruling in the absence of EEOC guidance, im-
plying that its holding might have differed had regulatory guidance ex-
isted."
Seemingly in response to that case, the EEOC amended its guideline
on national origin discrimination in 1980, suggesting that English-only
rules could be a form of national origin discrimination.26 The EEOC
guideline on national origin discrimination now states that discrimination
on the basis of national origin includes "the denial of equal employment
opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of
origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic
characteristics of a national origin group."27 Courts now generally accept
that the definition of national origin includes language and regularly
analyze claims regarding English-only rules under the umbrella of Title
VII.
Because English-only challenges are a relatively new component of Ti-
tle VII jurisprudence,29 these challenges have been received with diffi-
24. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268-69. In Gloor, a lumber and supply salesman was fired
for violating company policy by speaking to a co-worker in Spanish. See id. at 266. The
district court found that the plaintiff was discharged partly for deficient performance and
partly because he violated the English-only policy. See id The Fifth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the discharge violated Title VII, however, because the court re-
fused to relate the bilingual plaintiff's language choice to his national origin. See id.
25. See id. at 268 n.i. Indeed, the EEOC's subsequent promulgation of guidelines on
national origin discrimination has jeopardized the reasoning in Gloor, but no Fifth Circuit
case has expressly overruled Gloor.
26. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg.
85,632, 85,635 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1997). The EEOC first amended the guideline in 1974 to con-
form to judicial interpretations of the scope of "national origin." See 45 Fed. Reg. at
85,632. The EEOC further amended the guideline to restructure and clarify the earlier
guidelines and to add the provision finding English-only rules to be national origin dis-
crimination. See id. at 85,632, 85,635.
28. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1993) (dis-
cussing an English-only policy as a possible "burdensome term or condition of employ-
ment" prohibited by Title VII); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 (analyzing employer's English-only
rule under Title VII); Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 939 (E.D. Va.
1995) (analyzing a bank's English-only policy as national origin discrimination); cf. McNeil
v. Aguilos, 831 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (analyzing under Title VII plaintiff's
"reverse English-only" claim of language discrimination, asserted because non-English
speakers violated her rights as a native English speaker).
29. The first decision regarding a private employer's English-only rule was Saucedo v.
Brothers Well Service, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979). In that case, an oil drilling
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culty by the courts,3° and varying approaches to their adjudication have
left this area of law in conflict.31 In fact, the Ninth Circuit has rejected
the EEOC's guidance regarding the appropriate analysis in English-only
cases, finding that the EEOC's analysis defines incorrectly the parties'
burdens of proof." While the EEOC guidance creates a presumption
that all English-only rules constitute national origin discrimination,33 the
Ninth Circuit has refused to relieve plaintiffs of their initial burden to put
forth evidence supporting their particular discrimination claims?4
This Comment explores the current definition and analysis of national
origin discrimination, as applied to challenges to English-only rules. Part
I explains disparate impact, disparate treatment, and hostile work envi-
ronment theories of discrimination, the general analyses currently ap-
plied in English-only cases. Part II discusses the courts' and the EEOC's
treatment of English-only rules thus far, applying disparate treatment,
hostile work environment, and disparate impact theories. Part III.A
concludes that courts have misapplied disparate impact analysis to the
context of English-only disputes. Part III.B notes that the hostile work
environment theory involves a virtually unattainable evidentiary burden
and concludes that plaintiffs will rarely win an English-only case on this
theory. Part III.C argues that the few courts applying disparate treat-
ment analysis are incorrectly formulating their judicial test. Part IV.A
recommends that courts broaden the definition of national origin to in-
clude ethnicity and language in order to define appropriately the adverse
company employed the plaintiff, and although the rig did not have an official English-only
rule, a supervisor informed the plaintiff that the company "did not tolerate any 'Mesican'
talk." Id. at 921. Although the court acknowledged that well-drilling is dangerous work
that requires close coordination of employees, and would justify the employer's policy that
workers speak only English while drilling, it acknowledged that the plaintiff was fired for
speaking two words of Spanish while he was not drilling. See id Thus, the court held that
the English-only rule, which "obviously" disparately impacted Mexican-American em-
ployees, was unjustified and was not motivated by business necessity. See id. at 922.
30. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (rejecting plaintiffs' claims that speaking English
created an unreasonably hostile work environment); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 (refusing to
find the language that an employee chose to speak equivalent to his national origin);
Long, 894 F. Supp. at 941 (holding that Title VII does not protect expression of national
origin and finding plaintiffs not to be adversely affected by employer's English-only rule).
31. See infra Part II (discussing split between EEOC and Ninth Circuit analyses of
English-only rules as national origin discrimination).
32. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (explicitly rejecting the EEOC Guideline be-
cause courts must analyze the totality of the circumstances, rather than creating per se
rules).
33. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1997) (stating that English-only rules will be presumed
to violate Title VII because they create burdensome employment conditions).
34. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490 (emphasizing Title VII plaintiffs' evidentiary
burden).
19981 1333
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impact of English-only rules. Finally, Part IV.B urges courts applying
disparate treatment analysis to recognize the extent to which language
affects nationality, thus creating a detrimental effect of English-only
rules solely on people of foreign origin.
I. CURRENT ANALYSES OF TITLE VII CLAIMS: DISPARATE IMPACT AND
DISPARATE TREATMENT
Courts have adopted two principal theories of liability to address the
various factual patterns that have emerged in Title VII claims, and each
involves a framework for evidentiary burden-shifting between the par-
ties." When an employer imposes a discriminatory term or condition of
employment with respect to a group of employees, a plaintiff may either
assert disparate impact theory36 or disparate treatment theory. 7
A. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact theory applies to claims involving employers' facially
neutral policies that affect a class protected by Title VII more harshly
than they affect an unprotected class." In disparate impact cases, the
plaintiff need not prove the employer's intent to discriminate.39
35. See Patrick Wallace, Note, English-Only Rules in the Workplace: Examining the
Need to Balance the Burdens of Proof Under Disparate Impact Analysis, 7 DEPAUL Bus.
L.J. 223, 226-27 (1994) (stating that there are three methods of analysis applicable to Title
VII claims: disparate treatment proved with evidence of direct discriminatory animus, dis-
parate treatment proved with evidence implying discriminatory animus, and disparate im-
pact proved by evidence of a significant adverse effect); see also 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN
& PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-4 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing
the general categories of discrimination).
36. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 81 & n.1 (discussing disparate
impact theory and noting that it is also known as the adverse impact theory).
37. See id. at 9 (discussing disparate treatment theory). Disparate treatment theory
involves an employer's treating certain employees differently from others, and the ques-
tion is whether those treated differently were so treated due to their association with a
protected class. See id. In contrast, disparate impact theory involves an employer's actions
that unintentionally affect disproportionate numbers of protected group members. See id
at 81.
38. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15
(1977) (explaining discrimination under disparate impact theory as discrimination in ef-
fect, despite an employer's seemingly benign policy).
39. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971). Employment discrimina-
tion authorities acknowledge Griggs as "the seminal adverse impact case" because the Su-
preme Court held that the consequences of employment actions are as significant as the
motivation for them. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 81.
The intent requirement distinguishes disparate impact theory from disparate treatment
theory. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (delineating the differences between these
two theories). Where an employment decision has been based on subjective criteria, how-
1334
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Through a combination of cases, the Supreme Court has set forth a
burden-shifting evidentiary framework for disparate impact cases.4° First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by show-
ing that the implicated employment practice significantly affects his or
her protected group.41 The burden then shifts to the employer to demon-
strate a legitimate "business necessity" for the employment practice.
42
The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer
could have used other non-discriminatory means to satisfy the same
business necessity. 43 If the employer could have used non-discriminatory
means, the practice is deemed to have actually been used as a "pretext"
for discriminating openly.44 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified this
three step framework. 5
ever, intent is often difficult to pinpoint and the distinction between disparate treatment
and disparate impact blurs. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 82 (ex-
plaining that, in such cases, plaintiffs often argue both disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories).
40. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (requiring that a
plaintiff make out a prima facie case of discrimination before an employer must prove
business necessity or job relatedness, and providing that once an employer demonstrates
business necessity, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that other non-
discriminatory practices were available to the employer); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (shifting
the burden to the employer to show a business reason for its discriminatory employment
practice after plaintiff has established a prima facie case).
41. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. At this stage, the plaintiff must put forth
some evidence that a certain employment practice has a significant adverse impact on his
protected group. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 88. Plaintiffs often
employ statistics to show the adverse impact. See id. at 88-89.
42. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The Supreme Court has been unclear in defining
"business necessity." See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 107-08 (observ-
ing that the Court's tests range from whether the employer shows that the employment
practice is "necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business" to whether the
employment practice merely "significantly serve[s] ... the employer's legitimate business
interests"). In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Supreme Court
considered whether providing certain cannery workers with more comfortable housing
and eating arrangements significantly served the employer's business goal. See id at 647-
48, 659. In codifying the burden-shifting framework for disparate impact cases, however,
Congress overruled Wards Cove's requirement that the employer demonstrate that the
discriminatory practice at issue "significantly serve" the employer's legitimate employ-
ment goals. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 85.
43. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. The Sixth Circuit set forth the following
factors for courts to consider in analyzing plaintiffs' assertions that employers could have
used alternative practices: subsequent practices adopted by the employer, hiring policies
of similar businesses, and the cost and safety of other available practices. See Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981).
44. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994) (codifying the burden-shifting provisions set
out in Griggs and Albemarle Paper).
Catholic University Law Review
B. Disparate Treatment
The second theory of liability used in Title VII cases is disparate
treatment theory." In a case of disparate treatment, an employer has
treated a member of a protected group less favorably than another and,
unlike in disparate impact cases, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent in the employer's actions.47 For example, in International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States,4 employees alleged that their em-
ployer, a freight carrier, discriminated against black and Hispanic-
surnamed applicants, hiring them for lower-paying and less desirable po-
sitions than the positions for which it hired white applicants.4 ' The Su-
preme Court considered the facts that only five percent of the employees
were black and only four percent had Hispanic surnames, and that all of
the black employees were hired after the litigation had begun.0 These
factors, along with other disparities the plaintiffs presented, amounted to
a pattern of disparate treatment and led the Court to conclude that the
distinctions made among employees were premised on race. 1
Like disparate impact cases, disparate treatment cases involve a bur-
den-shifting framework. 2 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,3 the
Supreme Court established this framework, stating that the plaintiff in a
disparate treatment case must first put on sufficient evidence to raise an
inference of discrimination.4 The burden then shifts to the employer to
46. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 9-10 (discussing disparate
treatment theory).
47. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (defining disparate treatment and distinguishing it from disparate impact); see also
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (discussing disparate treat-
ment theory and the shifting burdens involved in such a case); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) (permitting, in disparate treatment cases, inference of
discriminatory motive in the absence of any other explanation for an employment decision
once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing).
48. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
49. See id. at 328-29.
50. See id. at 337. The defendants argued that statistics are misleading and seem to
demand preferential treatment of certain groups, a practice Title VII does not require.
See id. at 339, 340-41 n.20. The Court pointed out, however, that the plaintiffs' statistical
evidence was well corroborated. See id. at 339-40. In addition, the Court stated that it
routinely permits plaintiffs to rely on statistical evidence to make out a prima facie case
when the statistics reflect extreme disparities in hiring. See id. at 339.
51. See id. at 342-43.
52. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 11-13 (discussing the shifting
burdens of proof).
53. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
54. See id. at 802. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stressed the flexibility required
in the adjudication of plaintiffs' prima facie Title VII cases. See id. at 802 n.13. An infer-
ence of discrimination may be raised by a plaintiff in the manner that best fits the factual
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articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the discriminatory
treatment.55 If the employer satisfies this burden, the burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason the employer has ar-
ticulated is merely a pretext for discrimination.56
C. Hostile Work Environment
In a subset of disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs may allege a "hostile
work environment., 57 In these cases, employees claim that certain be-
haviors in the workplace create a hostile work environment, which
equals the burdensome term or condition of employment prohibited by
Title VIIL In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,5 the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated a definition of hostile work environment that was first put forth
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v. EEOCw In Rogers,
the court had found that "terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment," as the phrase is used in Title VII, could encompass an atmosphere
charged with discriminatory tensions.6'
circumstances. See Diaz v. AT&T, 752 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 n.12 (1st Cir. 1979)). As the Supreme Court noted,
"[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981).
55. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56 (holding that the employer must articulate, but
not prove, a non-discriminatory reason for the employment practice); McDonnell Doug-
las, 411 U.S. at 802 (same).
56. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
57. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (stating that proof of a
hostile work environment constitutes a Title VII claim). In Meritor Savings, a female em-
ployee successfully established a Title VII claim for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment by proving that her supervisor made unwelcome sexual advances toward her. See id
at 65, 67. Hostile work environment cases are also known as an "abusive work environ-
ment" cases. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1993).
58. See Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 66-67. Generally, in order to prevail in a Title
VII hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must prove that the employer subjected the
plaintiff to abusive and unwelcome conduct, and that the conduct was severe and perva-
sive enough to unreasonably alter the plaintiff's (or a similarly situated person's) working
conditions. See id. at 65-67. Plaintiffs often assert hostile work environment claims in
connection with gender-based harassment. See id.; Harris, 510 U.S. at 18-19. The EEOC
has defined one type of sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances... [having]
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's ... working envi-
ronment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997).
59. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
60. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rogers, the plaintiff was the only employee of an
optometry group to have a Spanish surname, and she charged her employer with national
origin discrimination when she was terminated. See id. at 236. She also alleged that the
employer created an offensive work environment for employees by segregating patients
based on their national origin. See id.
61. Id. at 238. Although cautious not to hold that an employer's mere ethnic or racial
epithet goes so far as to constitute a hostile work environment, the court in Rogers did
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In Harris, the Supreme Court listed various factors, such as the fre-
quency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, to be considered in
determining whether an environment is hostile.62 The Court stated that
lower courts must make these determinations based on the totality of the
circumstances.63 In practice, the Supreme Court's definition of a hostile
work environment, requiring severe and pervasive conduct, has been a
difficult standard for plaintiffs to meet.64
II. CONFLICTED AUTHORITY REGARDING THE EFFECT AND ANALYSIS
OF ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
The fact that English-only claims fall within the ambit of Title VII con-
strains courts to analyze plaintiffs' claims according to the theories of dis-
crimination applicable to Title VII cases.65 The courts, therefore, use ei-
ther disparate treatment or disparate impact analysis to determine the
legality of English-only rules.66 Thus far, the federal appellate courts
have considered few challenges to private employers' English-only
67rules. Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of
urge that "the relationship between an employee and his working environment is of such
significance as to be entitled to statutory protection." Id. at 237-38.
62. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The Court set out, as a non-exhaustive list, the fol-
lowing factors: "frequency of discriminatory conduct," severity of discriminatory conduct,
physical threat or humiliation resulting from discriminatory conduct (as opposed to mere
offensive utterance), and unreasonable interference with job performance. Id.
63. See id.
64. See Miranda Oshige, Note, What's Sex Got to Do With It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565,
566-70 (1995) (arguing that the requirement that plaintiffs establish severe and pervasive
discrimination implies that the courts actually condone some level of discrimination in the
workplace, and proposing that hostile work environment claims be recast as straight dispa-
rate treatment claims).
65. See Wallace, supra note 35, at 226-27 (stating that in a Title VII case, an employee
will allege either disparate treatment, proved with either direct or circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory animus, or disparate impact).
66. Cf. Cara D. Helper, Comment, Enforcing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin: The Overextension
of English-Only Rules in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 79 MINN. L. REV. 391, 419-21 (1994)
(noting that the Spun Steak court characterized the employer policy at issue as nondis-
criminatory on its face, thus making a disparate impact analysis applicable). But see Juan
F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the
Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 265, 289-99 (1990) [hereinafter Perea III] (advocating
disparate treatment analysis of English-only rules due to the effect of the rules solely on a
protected group).
67. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1993) (His-
panic employees challenged meat distributor's policy that employees speak English in
connection with work); Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988) (bi-
lingual court clerk brought action against judicial district for policy requiring that clerks
speak only English except when acting as translators), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016
(1989); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1987) (radio disk
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whether a private employer's English-only rule constitutes national ori-
gin discrimination."
A. Disparate Treatment
Although some scholars have advocated the use of disparate treatment
analysis in challenging English-only rules,69 such challenges have been
rare.7" This infrequency is due to the fact that English-only rules appear
facially neutral in their requirement that all employees speak English."
Thus, disparate impact analysis has been used more often.72
Only in one case did a circuit court apply disparate treatment analysis
jockey claimed racial and national origin discrimination when program director instructor
forbade his speaking Spanish on the air); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266-67 (5th Cir.
1980) (lumberyard employee claimed that English-only policy constituted a discriminatory
employment condition).
68. The Supreme Court has received only one petition for certiorari and has denied
it. See Garcia v. Spun Steak, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994). Recently, however, the Court did ex-
amine the constitutionality of an amendment to Arizona's constitution, which would have
required that all state business be conducted in English. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 69 F.3d
920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans For Official Eng-
lish v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). In Yniguez, the Ninth Circuit did not clarify the law
with respect to English-only rules in private employment, instead it addressed a public sec-
tor English-only rule. See id. Although the district court had concluded that the constitu-
tional article was an invalid regulation of speech in public employment, the Supreme
Court vacated that decision on procedural grounds. See id. at 947; Arizonans For Official
English, 117 S. Ct. at 1057, 1071-72.
69. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 293-95 (asserting that disparate treatment analysis
is more appropriate than disparate impact analysis because English-only rules exclusively
affect a protected class and thus employers use language to discriminate intentionally
against employees of foreign origin); see also Dan Cooperider & Stephen Wiss, The Limits
of Deference: The Ninth Circuit Rejects EEOC Guidelines on English-Only Rules in the
Workplace - Garcia v. Spun Steak, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 119, 142-49 (1995) (ar-
guing that the EEOC and the Ninth Circuit have failed to guide adequately lower courts'
disparate impact analysis of English-only rules, and urging acceptance of Perea's sugges-
tion that courts apply disparate treatment analysis).
70. See Cooperider & Wiss, supra note 69, at 147 (noting that most courts have ana-
lyzed English-only rules under disparate impact theory because courts have assumed the
rules to be facially neutral). But see Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409-11 (applying disparate
treatment theory to an English-only case); Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp.
933, 941-42 (E.D. Va. 1995) (considering English-only plaintiffs' disparate treatment
claim).
71. See supra note 8 (citing examples of English-only rules that were facially applica-
ble to all employees).
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing this trend). But see Perea
III, supra note 66, at 289 (asserting that while English-only rules appear facially neutral,
they exclusively affect individuals of foreign national origin).
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to an English-only challenge.73 In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,74 a bilin-
gual plaintiff alleged race and national origin discrimination75 when his
employer fired him from his disk jockey position for violating the radio
station's requirement that he broadcast only in English.76 After years of
broadcasting in English, Jurado had begun using some Spanish on his ra-
dio show, pursuant to the program director's instructions, in order to at-
tract Hispanic listeners. 7 Noting that the use of Spanish on the air did
not, in fact, boost the station's ratings, the station's new program director
instructed Jurado to broadcast only in English."
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment rul-
ing for the employer, espousing the district court's application of dispa-
rate treatment an'alysis.79 The court explained that it was the plaintiff's
burden to prove that the station's rule was motivated by discriminatory
animus." The court ruled that Jurado's evidence that a consultant found
the station to be inordinately preoccupied with ethnicity, and that a su-
pervisor had commented on the ethnic undertones of Jurado's show, did
not satisfy the burden of proving discriminatory intent." Thus the plain-
73. See Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409-11. In Jurado, the court also applied disparate im-
pact analysis and rejected the plaintiff's argument that the English-only rule dispropor-
tionately disadvantaged Hispanics on the ground that Jurado himself was bilingual and
could therefore comply with the rule. See id. at 1412.
The Eastern District of Virginia also applied disparate treatment analysis to an English-
only claim. See Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 941-42 (E.D. Va.
1995). In Long, the employer instituted an English-only policy to eliminate tensions aris-
ing when bilingual employees spoke Spanish so that others would not understand. See id.
at 939, 942. The court summarily stated that the plaintiffs had failed to prove discrimina-
tory intent. See id. at 942. The court did not, however, methodically apply disparate
treatment analysis. Rather than first assessing the merits of the plaintiffs' prima facie case,
the court skipped to the employer's proffered reasons for the English-only policy and
found them reasonable. See id.
74. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
75. See id. at 1408. The court made no distinction between the plaintiff's separately-
alleged bases of discrimination. See id. Challenges to English-only rules are usually
brought as discrimination on the basis of national origin. See supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text (discussing cases considering English-only rules as race and national origin dis-
crimination).
76. See id. at 1409.
77. See id. at 1408.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1409. The district court found that Jurado failed to establish a prima
facie case under disparate treatment theory because he failed to show that the station had
discharged him for discriminatory reasons. See id. The court found, instead, that the sta-
tion had discharged Jurado for failing to comply with its formatting decision, a legitimate
business reason. See id. at 1409-10.
80. See id at 1409.
81. See id. at 1410. The court rejected Jurado's argument that the decision to dis-
1340 [Vol. 47:1327
English Only in the Workplace
tiff failed to make out a prima facie case.2 In addition, the court adopted
the employer's explanation that the English-only order was a "program-
ming decision motivated by marketing, ratings, and demographic con-
cerns.83
Alternatively, but still within the context of disparate treatment, Ju-
rado argued that even absent the employer's specific intent to discrimi-
nate, an English-only rule imposed on a bilingual employee could be
deemed a discriminatory discharge criterion on its own." The court
ruled, however, that in a case such as this one, where a plaintiff can com-
ply easily with the rule but chooses not to do so, an employer may en-
force a limited English-only policy. 5 In other words, the court held that
if an employee can comply with an employment criterion, the criterion is
not discriminatory in nature. 6 Thus, the plaintiff failed to present suffi-
cient evidence of discrimination to prove disparate treatment.8 7
B. Hostile Work Environment
Courts have also analyzed whether English-only rules create a hostile
work environment for employees of foreign origin." In Garcia v. Spun
Steak Co.,89 two Spanish-speaking employees and their union challenged
a meat-producing company's English-only rule.?o The employer insti-
tuted the rule after receiving complaints from other employees that the
plaintiffs were insulting their co-workers in Spanish.91 Plaintiffs argued
that the English-only rule created an atmosphere of "inferiority, isola-
tion, and intimidation," thus constituting national origin discrimination
charge him was racially motivated, finding that the radio station had articulated legitimate
business reasons for the English-only rule: demographics and marketing concerns. See id.
82. See id. at 1409; see also supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing the
proof required to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment).
83. Id. at 1410.
84. See id. at 1411 (noting the holding in Diaz v. AT&T, 752 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir.
1985) that an employment action based on discriminatory employment criteria may inde-
pendently constitute a prima facie case of disparate treatment).
85. See id. (noting that in Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980), and
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1986) Eng-
lish-only rules are permissible if they are necessary and justified by business necessity).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1993) (scrutinizing
plaintiffs' argument that the employer's English-only rule created an atmosphere of in-
timidation and isolation); see also infra Part III.B (discussing hostile work environment
theory).
89. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
90. See id. at 1483-84.
91. See id at 1483.
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under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs.93
The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded.94 The court
found that the bilingual plaintiffs had not made out a prima facie case
because the English-only policy did not have a significantly adverse ef-
fect on Hispanics, the protected group.95 The court not only refused to
create a per se rule that the effect of all English-only rules amounts to a
hostile work environment, it also found that the plaintiffs in Spun Steak
had presented insufficient evidence of a hostile environment.96
C. Disparate Impact
For the most part, the EEOC and the courts seem to agree that dispa-
rate impact analysis is appropriate in English-only cases.97 When apply-
ing disparate impact analysis, however, authorities have confused the
proper burden-shifting framework" and, as a result, the law regardingdisparate impact analysis of English-only cases is unsettled.99
92. Id. at 1486-87.
93. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., No. C-91-1949 RHS, 1991 WL 268021, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 23, 1991), rev'd, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). Although the unpublished district
court opinion did not reveal the court's reasoning, the Ninth Circuit stated that the North-
ern District of California had granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs because the
English-only policy disparately impacted the employees without business justification. See
Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484.
94. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490.
95. See id. at 1489.
96. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488-89; see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying
text (discussing evidentiary requirements for hostile work environment claims).
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1997) (explaining that English-only rules negatively
impact employees of foreign origin because primary language is an essential element of
national origin); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 21, at § 623.6 (advising
EEOC investigators that adverse impact analysis will apply to most English-only chal-
lenges); Cooperider & Wiss, supra note 69, at 147 (observing that most courts have treated
English-only rules as facially neutral and thus they require disparate impact analysis).
98. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (stating that employers' English-only rules presump-
tively violate Title VII). The EEOC appears to place the initial burden on the defendant
to articulate the business necessity for such rules. See id. But see Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at
1486 (holding that the initial burden rests with the employee to prove that an English-only
rule is discriminatory). The Ninth Circuit's pronouncement of the law and contradiction
of the EEOC on this point have critical policy implications, because one-third of the non-
English-speaking population lives and works within the Ninth Circuit. See Transcript of
EEOC Meeting, Mar. 14, 1995 at 26.
99. See Tanya J. Stanish, Comment, English-Only Rules in the Workplace: Discrimi-
nation or Employer Prerogative? A Comment on Spun Steak v. Garcia, 7 DEPAUL Bus.
L.J. 435, 439-42 (1995) (arguing that deference given to the EEOC's statutory interpreta-
tion should be limited because the EEOC's perspective contradicts the congressional in-
tent underlying Title VII to preserve employer prerogative in employment decisions). But
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Consistent with the disparate impact paradigm for Title VII cases, a
plaintiff in an English-only case must first introduce evidence that the
rule adversely affects his or her protected class.1°° Courts have hesitated
to accept such evidence, however, such as in Garcia v. Gloor.'01 In that
case, a Mexican American salesman challenged a company rule that em-
ployees speak only English except when communicating with Spanish-
speaking customers."2 Garcia claimed that his employer fired him when
he responded in Spanish to another Mexican American employee's ques-
tion, which was asked in Spanish."3 Garcia argued that his employer
violated Title VII by denying him a privilege enjoyed by employees
whose native language was English."°
The Fifth Circuit held that Garcia's claim was beyond the scope of Ti-
tle VII because Title VII protects against discrimination based only on
immutable characteristics,' °s not employee preferences."6 The court held
that because the plaintiff was fluent in both Spanish and English, his
see Michael F. Patterson, Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Company: English-Only Rules in the
Workplace, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 286-90 (1995) (advocating deference to the EEOC's
authority to guide the law with respect to English-only claims). Patterson asserts that the
Guideline merits judicial deference because it meets the Supreme Court's test that agency
guidelines be thoroughly considered, involve valid rationales, and be interpreted consis-
tently with prior and future interpretations. See id. at 287. Patterson also finds that the
EEOC sufficiently collected comments and considered amendments, such that the Com-
mission cannot be said to have whimsically contravened congressional intent. See id.
100. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975); see also supra notes
40-45 and accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary requirements for disparate im-
pact cases).
101. 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding no disparate impact on the plaintiff be-
cause he chose not to observe the English-only rule).
102. See id. at 266.
103. See id. The circumstances surrounding Garcia's discharge are not clear. See id. at
266-67. In fact, the district court adopted the employer's testimony that Garcia was fired
for a combination of reasons, including poor work performance. See id. In addition, the
court found that Garcia had violated the English-only policy not once, but repeatedly. See
id.
104. See id. at 268. Garcia's argument linked the privilege of speaking the language of
one's choice with national origin, because national origin determines language preference.
See id.
105. See id. at 269 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091
(5th Cir. 1975) (observing that one justification for protecting a particular characteristic
through Title VII is the characteristic's immutability)); see also Perea III, supra note 66, at
279-84 (advocating the view that primary language is "practically immutable" and thus
deserves protection under Title VII). Perea argues that language is to people of foreign
origin as pregnancy is to women, and thus national origin characteristics deserve the statu-
tory protection afforded to women. See id. at 279-80; see also infra notes 207-16 and ac-
companying text (suggesting parallel disparate treatment analyses for English-only and
pregnancy discrimination cases).
106. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269 (describing the plaintiff's use of one language or an-
other as a preference).
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ability to comply with the English-only policy by speaking English meant
that his speaking Spanish was not "immutable."1"7 Therefore, the policy
had no discriminatory impact on him. The court rejected the plaintiff's
disparate impact claim, insisting that there could be no disparate impact
if the affected employee could easily comply with the rule but simply
opted not to do so.19
The EEOC responded to the Gloor decision by promulgating a new
section of the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin
(the Guideline or the EEOC Guideline)."' The EEOC Guideline states
that rules requiring employees to speak English at all times presump-
tively violate Title VII due to their adverse impact on those of foreign
origin."' The Guideline also asserts that rules requiring employees to
speak English only at certain times are presumptively discriminatory, but
that an employer may rebut the presumption by showing that business
necessity requires the rule."' The presumption established in the Guide-
line implements the EEOC's view that English-only rules, by their na-
ture, adversely impact non-native English-speakers, 13 contrary to the
Fifth Circuit's perspective in Gloor."'
107. See id. at 270.
108. See id. at 269-70.
109. See id. at 270. But see infra Parts III.A & IV.A (discussing the shortcomings of
the "ability to comply" test when used in connection with disparate impact analysis).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1997) (extending 29 C.F.R. § 1606 to regulate English-only
rules).
111. See id. The Guideline reasons that requiring employees to speak English at all
times constitutes a burdensome employment condition prohibited by Title VII because
language is closely related to national origin. See id. Thus, prohibiting employees from
speaking the language comfortable to them disadvantages them based on their national
origin. See id. The Guideline does not consider the extent to which an employee can
comply with an English-only rule. See id.
112. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)-(b); see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text
(discussing employers' business necessity defense). The business necessities employers
assert most frequently in defense of English-only rules are that the rules: (1) curb ethnic
tensions among employees; (2) limit disruptions in the workplace; (3) support assimilation
in a predominantly English-speaking country; (4) ensure adequate supervision by supervi-
sors who speak only English; and (5) help maintain safety in foreseeably dangerous cir-
cumstances. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 300-01 (citing cases in which employers as-
serted these justifications and assessing the validity of each). This Comment suggests that
courts focus too quickly on employers' justifications, improperly glossing over the actual
discriminatory impact of English-only rules. See infra note 189 and accompanying text
(emphasizing the cultural importance of language).
113. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 21, at § 623.6(a) (basing the pre-
sumption of discrimination on the EEOC's recognition that primary language constitutes
an essential national origin characteristic).
114. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,270 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that the employer's
English-only policy had no adverse impact on the Spanish-speaking employees who could
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Judicial decisions issued after the publication of the Guideline have
varied in their perspective on the impact of English-only rules on non-
native English-speakers."' In Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,"6 the Ninth
Circuit followed the EEOC Guideline, presuming that the Municipal
Court's policy, requiring employees to speak English except when acting
as official translators or during personal conversations on breaks, dis-
criminated on the basis of national origin.1 7 Following the burden-
shifting paradigm, the court examined the business justifications the em-
ployer offered, namely that (1) "the United States is an English-speaking
country and California an English-speaking state;" (2) Spanish spoken
among co-workers disrupts the workplace; (3) the English-only rule
promotes racial harmony; and (4) the English-only rule ensures efficient
supervision.' Ultimately, the court held each of these justifications in-
comply with the rule).
115. Compare Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
that employer's justifications did not override discriminatory impact of English-only rule),
vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989), with Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489
(9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the presumption that English-only rules poison the working envi-
ronment with ethnic hostility).
116. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
117. See id. at 1036, 1040-45. The court in Gutierrez adopted the EEOC Guideline,
agreeing that English-only rules create a burdensome employment condition. See id. at
1040. The court thus presumed a discriminatory impact and carefully scrutinized the em-
ployer's justifications for the English-only rule. See id. at 1041-44.
118. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-43. One scholar has argued that these justifica-
tions are often insufficient. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 300-17. Perea observes that an
employer's choice to support English as our national language likely has no direct relation
to the nature of the employer's business, and therefore may not legitimately constitute a
"business justification." See id. at 301-02. Perea also asserts that "disruption in the work-
place" arises through employees' perceptions of private conversations they cannot under-
stand. See id. at 305. He points out that the personal bias that inevitably gives rise to such
disruptions is an inappropriate consideration when analyzing business necessity. See id.
With respect to the notion that English-only rules promote harmony among ethnic groups,
Perea asserts that stereotyped fears and tensions surrounding ethnicity are precisely what
Title VII works to eliminate from the workplace. See id. at 302-04. Perea argues that,
ironically, it is often the private biases of the majority that result in English-only rules,
thus defeating employers' own "harmony" justification. See id. Finally, Perea examines
employers' justification that English-only rules ensure effective supervision. See id. at 307-
10. He notes that an English-only rule must significantly aid the employer in its supervi-
sion and must be job-related in order to qualify as a business necessity. See id at 307.
Perea provides several examples of jobs that might or might not be appropriate contexts
for English-only rules. See id. at 307-10. Where conversation is the core of the job, it is
likely that the language spoken by an employee will be job-related. See id at 309-10
(commenting on the facts in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987)).
On the other hand, if employees in a sales job speak to each other in a language other than
English, this may annoy customers, thus prompting supervisors to require English only.
See id. at 309. The private biases of customers, however, do not justify a non-job-related
employment practice. See id.
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sufficient and preserved the presumption that the English-only rule had a
discriminatory impact."1
However, the Ninth Circuit's compliance with the EEOC Guideline
did not last long. The decision in Gutierrez was vacated as moot when
the plaintiff quit her job while her case was pending before the Supreme
Court.2 This left judicial interpretation of the EEOC Guideline and
English-only case law in an unclear position. The Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Gutierrez held no precedential value, yet the reasoning voiced in
the opinion could not be ignored.'
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit effectively ignored Gutierrez the next
time it considered the adverse impact of an English-only rule.122 In Gar-
cia v. Spun Steak Co.,' 3 the plaintiffs described the adverse effects of
their employer's English-only rule in three ways: (1) the rule prohibited
them from expressing their culture at work; (2) the rule denied them a
privilege of employment; and (3) the rule "create[d] an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation, and intimidation."'1 24 The court reasoned that (1)
Title VII does not protect workers' expression of their culture in the
workplace;' (2) privileges in employment, such as the ability to con-
119. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044-45. First, the Ninth Circuit found that requiring
employees, hired specifically to translate to or from foreign languagesto speak only Eng-
lish did not advance the cause of creating a single language system in the state or country.
See id. at 1042. Second, the court rejected the employer's contention that foreign lan-
guages spoken among employees would create a "Tower of Babel," reasoning that speak-
ing a language other than English did not create a disruption, especially given that em-
ployees were hired to speak Spanish with Hispanic clients. See id Third, the court held
that the employer had not provided sufficient evidence that an English-only rule worked
to ameliorate any racial tensions in the context of this case. See id. Finally, the court
found illogical the argument that employees should communicate among themselves in
English in order to ensure efficient supervision, considering that employees spoke Spanish
for job-related purposes unchallenged by their supervisors who spoke only English. See
id. at 1043.
120. See Municipal Court v. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. 1016, 1016 (1989). The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal and vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment because it no longer
had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim. See id. (citing United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)).
121. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that dismissal on grounds of mootness
does not jeopardize the reasoning of a decision).
122. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993). The court
dismissed Gutierrez in a footnote, remarking that "[t]he case has no precedential authority
... because it was vacated as moot by the Supreme Court. We are in no way bound by its
reasoning." Id.
123. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 1486-87; see also supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (explaining the
court's reasoning with regard to plaintiffs' hostile work environment claim).
125. See id. at 1487. The court dispensed with this argument quickly, finding it "axio-
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verse, are legitimately controlled by the employer, and therefore the em-
ployer had every right to include speaking English as an employment
condition;'26 and (3) the plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to
prove a significant impact that amounted to a hostile work environ-
ment.27
The court, after addressing the plaintiffs' specific arguments, explicitly
rejected the presumption of discriminatory impact in the EEOC Guide-
line.' The court refused to defer to an administrative agency's statutory
interpretation where there were compelling indications that the interpre-
tation contravened congressional intent.'29 The court explained that the
Guideline found no support in the plain language of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, and that it contradicted the legislators' express intent to preserve
employer prerogative in management decisions."'
Herein lies what many scholars perceive to be the critical split in
authority regarding the analysis of English-only rules.' While the
EEOC Guideline appears to place the initial burden on the employer to
offer a legitimate justification for an English-only rule,'32 the court in
Spun Steak followed traditional disparate impact case law and the 1991
Civil Rights Act, assigning to the employee the initial burden of proving
matic that an employee must often sacrifice individual self-expression during working
hours." Id.
126. See id. at 1487-88. The court then reasoned that as an employer, Spun Steak had
the right to define an employee privilege narrowly. See id. at 1487. But see Jeffrey D.
Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 871, 881-82 (1995) (explaining that the court in Spun Steak unfairly adopted the
employer's perspective of the employment privilege in deciding that such a privilege did
not exist for these plaintiffs).
127. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489; see also supra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text (explaining hostile work environment analysis).
128. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90. The court explained that in some circum-
stances an English-only rule could contribute to a discriminatory working environment,
but it refused to adopt the per se rule of the EEOC Guideline that English-only rules
themselves amount to hostile work environments. See id. at 1489.
129. See id. at 1489.
130. See id. at 1489-90 (referring to statements in the legislative history indicating
Congress' preference to interfere with the internal employment decisions of an employer
only to the limited extent necessary to prevent discrimination).
131. Compare Helper, supra note 66, at 409 (advocating adherence to the EEOC
Guideline), and Patterson, supra note 99, at 286-88 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit in Spun
Steak failed to provide compelling reasons not to defer to the EEOC's perspective on an
issue within its area of expertise), with Stanish, supra note 99, at 437 (arguing the impor-
tance of employer prerogative in discrimination actions), and Wiley, supra note 6, at 573-
78 (advocating rejection of the EEOC Guideline).
132. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1997) ("The Commission will presume that [an English-
only] rule violates Title VII ....") (emphasis added).
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that an employer's action has had a discriminatory impact.'33 Since the
Spun Steak decision, no appellate court has had occasion to revisit the
issue of and set precedent regarding the disparate impact English-only
rules cause in the workplace. Therefore, the EEOC interpretation re-
mains at odds with judicial analysis.
III. THE JUDICIARY'S IMPROPER FORMULATION OF THE ADVERSE
EFFECT OF ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
Courts often fail to define appropriately the effect of English-only
rules on people of foreign origin. 34 Title VII plaintiffs traditionally have
argued disparate impact theory in connection with standard hiring or
promotion criteria that adversely impact a particular class of candi-
dates. "'35 For English-only plaintiffs to succeed using disparate impact
analysis, courts first must understand better the nature of the adverse
impact of English-only rules.36 Alternatively, plaintiffs have argued hos-
tile work environment theory when an employment condition creates an
atmosphere of intimidation."' In order for English-only plaintiffs to suc-
ceed using hostile work environment theory, they must make a strong
showing of egregious work conditions."' Applying a third alternative,
plaintiffs have argued disparate treatment theory where a policy or prac-
tice facially treats one classification of employees differently from an-
133. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486 (applying Supreme Court precedent that re-
quires courts to consider first a plaintiff's prima facie evidence of adverse impact); see also
supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing the burden-shifting paradigm in dis-
parate impact cases).
134. See Kirtner, supra note 126, at 898-99 (asserting that courts have incorrectly as-
sumed that an employee's "choice" of language is indicative of whether an English-only
rule affects him or her).
135. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (disregarding discrimina-
tory intent and analyzing the disparate effect of diploma and test requirements on black
applicants); see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describing requirements for
disparate impact claims).
136. See Kirtner, supra note 126, at 904 (urging courts to discard their analyses of
plaintiffs' "choices" and to accept, as the Ninth Circuit did in Gutierrez, that English-only
rules negatively affect those of foreign origin).
137. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (establishing hostile work
environment as a Title VII violation because the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" in Title VII includes the creation of a work atmosphere steeped in dis-
crimination); see also supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (outlining hostile work en-
vironment theory).
138. See Oshige, supra note 64, at 566-67 (noting the courts' stringent evidentiary re-
quirements for hostile work environment claims, and asserting that, in the context of sex-
ual harassment, this standard implies that courts actually condone some lesser level of dis-
crimination).
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other.'39 In order for English-only plaintiffs to use disparate treatment
theory, they must convince the courts that English-only rules exclusively
affect people of foreign origin.'40
A. Disparate Impact Analysis: Defining the Actual Adverse Impact
Under disparate impact analysis, a plaintiff must first provide sufficient
evidence of adverse impact on his or her protected group.14' In English-
only cases, plaintiffs have made significant efforts to explain the adverse
impact of English-only rules on people of foreign origin. 42 The courts,
however, routinely find that plaintiffs who are bilingual to some degree
can comply with the English-only rules and are thus unaffected.4
The ability to comply with an employment practice is not the test tradi-
tionally applied to Title VII disparate impact cases.' 44 The fact that some
139. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (defining disparate treatment as the situation in which an "employer ... treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin") (emphasis added); see also supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining disparate treatment analysis).
140. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 293-94 (asserting that a characteristic closely cor-
related to a protected group deserves protection under Title VII).
141. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (setting forth the
burdens of proof in disparate impact cases); see also supra note 41 (discussing the plain-
tiff's initial burden in disparate impact cases).
142. See Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406,1409-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff
refused to comply with English-only rule because speaking English would take his charac-
ter away); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff argued that an em-
ployee more comfortable with a language other than English is denied an employment
privilege granted to those comfortable with English). At the appellate level, plaintiffs of-
ten file amicus curiae briefs urging courts to consider English-only rules' negative impact
on national origin minorities. See Brief of Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, American Civil Liberties Union of Texas and Northern California, and the
Employment Law Center at 5-6, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wynell,
95 F.3d 49 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-20523); Brief of Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, American Civil Liberties Union of Texas and Northern California, and
the Employment Law Center at 5-6, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Wynell, Inc., 91 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-20419) (arguing that English-only rules
interfere with communication and expression, force employees to monitor their words,
and suppress employees' ethnicity, identity, and personality).
143. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993); Jurado, 813
F.2d at 1411; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
144. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Reinhardt sharply criticized the "ability
to comply" defense, explaining that it was illogical of the majority to assume that one who
can comply with a rule is not negatively affected by it, analogizing a bilingual employee's
ability to speak English to an African American's ability to sit at the back of a bus. See id.;
see also Kirtner, supra note 126, at 898-905 (drawing a similar analogy and arguing that
neither precedent nor logic supports the "choice rationale").
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female applicants meet a certain height or weight standard, for example,
does not negate the fact that requiring the specific height or weight vio-
lates Title VII when the requirement excludes a disproportionate num-
ber of female applicants.145 Instead, courts deciding Title VII cases tradi-
tionally have examined the actual adverse impact of the policy at issue on
a protected class.146 Likewise, courts analyzing English-only cases must
consider the actual adverse impact of English-only rules.47
Courts have tended to view plaintiffs as either English speakers or
non-English speakers, rather than as people of foreign ethnicities who
speak English at various levels of fluency.'9 In reality, however, the ac-
tual impact of English-only policies falls on English-speaking employees
and non-English-speaking employees alike when both are of foreign ori-
Kirtner refers to various Title VII cases to show that a plaintiff's choice does not bar his
or her Title VII claim. See id. at 900-03. In a sex discrimination case, for example, the Su-
preme Court reasoned that a retirement plan that discriminated on the basis of sex was
unlawful even though employees participated in the plan voluntarily. See Arizona Gov-
erning Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1089 (1983) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part). The Supreme Court again pointed out the absurdity of the choice rationale in a
seminal sexual harassment case. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
There, the Court found that the district court had focused erroneously on the plaintiff's
"voluntary" submission to the defendant's requests for sexual favors, holding that the cor-
rect inquiry was whether the plaintiff indicated that the defendant's advances were unwel-
come. See id.
145. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (holding that height and
weight requirements had a sufficiently adverse impact on female applicants to constitute a
Title VII violation); see also Diaz v. AT&T, 752 F.2d 1356, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that the fact that another Mexican American was promoted instead of the Mexican
American plaintiff did not negate the plaintiff's evidence of national origin discrimina-
tion).
146. See Diaz, 752 F,2d at 1361-62 (finding that plaintiff put on sufficient evidence of
discriminatory impact, even though the employer hired a member of plaintiff's protected
class).
147. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that whether or not an individual speaks
English matters far less than the general impact of English-only prohibitions on language
minorities).
148. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483-84 (acknowledging that members of the plaintiff
class spoke English at various levels but terming them "the Spanish-speaking employees"
and assuming the representative plaintiffs to be "fully bilingual"); cf. Cutler, supra note 2,
at 1166, 1174 (urging a "trait-based approach" to national origin discrimination, whereby
courts would analyze the adverse impact of an employment practice on employees who
have assimilated to varying degrees); Kirtner, supra note 126, at 882 (arguing that a "mi-
nority-centric" perspective would dismantle the courts' view that bilingual plaintiffs are
unaffected by English-only rules).
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gin.149 In Garcia v. Gloor,' for example, the bilingual plaintiff argued
that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of national ori-
gin when it prohibited him from speaking Spanish on the job. 5' He al-
leged disparate impact, claiming that employees most comfortable
speaking English enjoyed a privilege that he, due to his national origin,
was denied."2 The Fifth Circuit held that no adverse impact could exist
when a bilingual employee exercised a preference as to which language
he or she spoke at any given time. 3 In other words, the court decided
that the English-only rule had the same impact on Garcia, a bilingual
employee, that it had on native English-speakers. The Ninth Circuit
has agreed with this approach, holding that bilingual plaintiffs do not suf-
fer an adverse effect from an English-only rule when they can comply
easily.55
Legal and other scholars assert, however, that this is a great miscon-
ception.56 One scholar analyzing English-only rules as national origin
149. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 292 (demonstrating that the effect of English-only
rules impacts almost equally on people who have no English fluency and those who are
fully "bilingual").
150. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). For further discussion of the case, see supra notes
101-109 and accompanying text.
151. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268.
152. See id. Garcia argued that, by prohibiting employees from speaking the language
most familiar to them, their employer denied non-native English-speakers a privilege
granted to native English-speakers. See id. He maintained that because language prefer-
ence is often determined by national origin, the English-only rules discriminate against
non-native English-speakers. See id.
153. See id. at 271.
154. Cf id. at 270 (noting that "there can be no disparate impact if the rule is one that
the affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual
preference").
155. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480,1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993). The court in
Spun Steak focused on the fact that plaintiffs in a disparate impact case must prove a sig-
nificant adverse impact, and reasoned that a bilingual employee's duty, under an English-
only rule, to stop himself or herself from occasionally speaking a language other than
English did not constitute a significant burden. See id. at 1488. The Ninth Circuit similarly
adopted an employer's "ability to comply" defense in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp. See
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Gloor, 618 F.2d at
270). Ironically, Jurado, like many plaintiffs bringing English-only challenges, was valued
by his employer for his bilingual ability, but was fired as the result of it. Cf id. at 1408 (de-
scribing the employer's flip-flop between encouraging and discouraging Jurado's speaking
Spanish on the air). The court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that an English-only rule
was a discriminatory discharge criterion when applied to a bilingual employee. See id. at
1411.
156. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 292 (stating that requiring people who possess
limited English proficiency to speak English at all times could be similar to "forcing a
right-handed person to write left-handed"); cf. WILMA S. LONGSTREET, ASPECTS OF
ETHNICITY: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN PLURALISTIC CLASSROOM[S] 19-20
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discrimination defines "bilingualism" as the ability "to speak two lan-
guages with nearly equal facility."'' 7 He explains that a person's primary
language is practically immutable, 8 and therefore asserts that many
people are not actually bilingual, although others might think they are
because they can communicate, even in a very limited sense, in English. 9
He describes bilingualism as more of "a spectrum of abilities in a second
language ranging from minimal ability to communicate in a second lan-
guage to equal facility in two languages."'" Thus, an employer cannot
necessarily contend that English-only rules have no actual adverse effect
on bilingual employees because the employer cannot truly know the ex-
tent to which a given employee is bilingual.
61
As stated in Judge Reinhardt's dissent from the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion not to rehear Spun Steak en banc, the "ability to comply" test also
demonstrates courts' insensitivity to the facts and history of discrimina-
tion.16  An employee's ability to comply with a rule is no measure of
whether the rule adversely affects him or her.163 Even when one has been
"assimilated" into American society, his or her native language is always
essential to his or her ethnic identity, and thus bilingualism is irrelevant
to the question of impact.' 64 By employing the "ability to comply" test
(1978) (observing that ethnically derived traits and behaviors are often acquired before a
person has full intellectual control over these traits and behaviors).
157. Perea III, supra note 66, at 292 (citing RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY
133 (1972)).
158. See id. at 279-87 (arguing that, among other reasons, difficulty in acquiring a lan-
guage other than a person's native tongue demonstrates the immutable nature of lan-
guage).
159. See id. at 292 (describing the misconception that any ability to speak a second
language makes a person bilingual).
160. Id. See generally William F. Mackey, The Description of Bilingualism, in
READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 554 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1968) (ex-
plaining that the concept of bilingualism has grown broader as scholars realize that bilin-
gual abilities function on a spectrum).
161. Cf Perea III, supra note 66, at 292 (describing the actual detriment of English-
only rules to all non-native English speakers, regardless of their proficiency in English).
162. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (providing examples of egregious and discrimi-
natory historical practices with which the victims could easily comply).
163. See id. Earlier, in Gutierrez, Judge Reinhardt emphasized the importance of cul-
tural pluralism, recognizing that language is an essential element of national origin. See
Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490
U.S. 1016 (1989). He reasoned that bilingualism does not dissolve the strong tie between
one's primary language and the culture derived from national origin. See id. at 1039.
Judge Reinhardt even posited that rules negatively affecting employees who speak with
accents or speak foreign languages may be mere pretexts for intentionally discriminating
against those people. See id.
164. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 292 (discussing the relationship between an indi-
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for adverse impact, the courts have failed to recognize the actual adverse
impact of English-only rules on people of foreign origin. '
B. Hostile Work Environment Theory: Plaintiffs' Heavy Evidentiary
Burden
Although the EEOC Guideline states that English-only rules may cre-
ate a hostile work environment,"' it is not surprising that the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the idea that English-only rules create an atmosphere of
ridicule and intimidation tantamount to a per se hostile work environ-
ment."' The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may allege harass-ment on a hostile work environment theory so long as the discriminatory
vidual's fluency and the impact of English-only rules). In a similar and expanding body of
law, plaintiffs and scholars make identical arguments in national origin discrimination
cases based on foreign accent. See, e.g., Fragrante v. Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 594, 596 (9th
Cir. 1989) (conceding the close connection between accent and national origin but finding
no discrimination against the plaintiff because his accent would hinder his ability to per-
form a relevant task); Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (noting plaintiff's pronounced accent despite her excellent command of
the English language and finding discrimination based upon her accent); Bell v. Home
Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 1549, 1554-55 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (discussing case law and EEOC
guidance on disparaging remarks about a plaintiff's accent as constituting actionable na-
tional origin discrimination); Rosina Lippi-Green, Accent, Standard Language Ideology,
and Discriminatory Pretext in the Courts, 23 LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY 163, 165 (1994)
(equating language with social identity and arguing that rejection of one's accent indicates
rejection of that person's ethnic heritage and cultural identity); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of
America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction,
100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1329 (1991) (asserting that accent is an identifier of self).
165. See Jeanne M. Jorgensen, Comment, "English-Only" in the Workplace and Title
VII Disparate Impact: The Ninth Circuit's Misplaced Application of "Ability to Comply"
Should Be Rejected in Favor of the EEOC's Business Necessity Test, 25 Sw. U. L. REV.
407, 420 (1996) (observing that courts finding no adverse impact probably based their de-
cisions on factors other than plaintiffs' prima facie evidence of adverse impact); see also
Perea III, supra note 66, at 292 (emphasizing the equally adverse effect of English-only
rules on bilingual employees).
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1997) (stating that English-only rules "may... create
an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin which
could result in a discriminatory working environment").
167. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993). The plaintiffs
in Spun Steak argued in accord with the EEOC Guideline that the English-only rule cre-
ated "an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation," which impacted a condi-
tion of employment so significantly as to violate Title VII. Id at 1486-87, 1489. The court,
however, refused to create a per se rule that English-only policies affect employment con-
ditions to the point of creating a hostile work environment. See id. at 1489 (rejecting the
EEOC Guideline). The Spun Steak court observed the complex and individualized dy-
namics of various types of employment and found that the plaintiffs had presented insuffi-
cient evidence to establish that the workplace environment met the standard for "hostil-
ity" created by the Supreme Court. See id.; see also supra notes 57-64 and accompanying
text (setting forth the definition of a hostile work environment).
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effect of an employment practice is sufficiently severe. 68 Although the
EEOC has explored the idea that English-only rules create a hostile
work environment,69 the legal standard of proof for such a claim, re-
quiring severity and pervasiveness of offensive conduct, is very difficult
to meet. 7°
Plaintiffs have argued that English-only rules create an atmosphere of
intimidation; 7' however, the rules themselves probably will constitute in-
sufficient evidence for courts to find discriminatory intent.72 The Spun
168. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a)(3) (1997) (stating that sexual harassment violates Title VII when it has the
"purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment").
169. In light of the Ninth Circuit precedent, as announced in Spun Steak, an EEOC
attorney outlined the law and factors to investigate in English-only cases. See William R.
Tamayo, National Origin Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: "English Only," Accent Discrimination and Language Fluency 6-7 (June 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In the section discussing investigations, the
attorney specifically listed questions relating to a perceived hostile work environment. See
id. at 7. For example, investigators should inquire whether enforcement of the English-
only rule amounts to harassment, as well as whether the discipline given is proportional to
the violation. See id. at 7-8. One question asks whether the English-only rule "exacer-
bate[s] existing tensions to contribute to an overall environment of discrimination," and
another considers whether the rule, in combination with other discriminatory behavior,
has led to an overall environment of discrimination. Id. at 7.
Aside from the English-only rule itself, courts also may evaluate whether the way in
which the rule is administered creates a hostile work environment. See Spun Steak, 998
F.2d at 1489 (acknowledging the possibility that an English-only rule administered in an
extreme manner could constitute a hostile work environment). The EEOC, for example,
suggests that investigators ask whether an English-only rule is "applied in such a draco-
nian way that it amounts to harassment," how severe the punishments are, and whether
"inadvertent slips of the tongue [are] unduly punished." Tamayo, supra note 169, at 7-8.
As with any investigation of a Title VII charge, investigators are also reminded to assess
the emotional damage suffered, and this may indicate harassment or a hostile work envi-
ronment. See id.
170. Cf. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of ... employment and create an
abusive working environment."'). In Meritor, the plaintiff alleged sex discrimination (sex-
ual harassment) under Title VII when her supervisor made suggestive comments and re-
peatedly requested sexual favors. See id. at 60. The Court found the plaintiff's claim meri-
torious, and thus set forth the test for future hostile work environment cases, in the
context of sexual harassment or otherwise. See id.; see also supra notes 62-63 and accom-
panying text (discussing the test for hostile work environment claims).
171. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486-87 (noting the plaintiff's argument that the Eng-
lish-only policy encouraged co-workers' intimidating and isolating behavior and created a
tense environment amounting to a burdensome employment condition); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7(a) (1997) (stating that English-only rules themselves create an atmosphere of in-
feriority, isolation, and intimidation).
172. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (refusing to create a per se rule that English-only
rules create hostile work environments).
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Steak court focused on this heavy burden of proof, explaining that the
inquiry regarding conditions that constitute a hostile work environment
is highly factual.'73 Comparing English-only rules to employment condi-
tions in, for example, a hostile work environment sexual harassment
case 4 indicates that the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to find that Eng-
lish-only rules, without further evidence of discrimination, amount to
such a burdensome employment condition.
C. Disparate Treatment Analysis: The Adverse Effect of English-Only
Rules Solely on People of Foreign Origin
In a disparate treatment case, a plaintiff alleges that an employer has
treated him or her differently from other employees due to the plaintiff's
membership in a protected class. 76 Unlike disparate impact cases, dispa-
rate treatment cases involve employment practices that are not facially
neutral.
177
173. See id. (stating that the complexities of individual workplaces make courts' per se
regulation of them impractical).
174. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60, 67 (finding plaintiff's allegations that her employer
repeatedly demanded sex during and after business hours, fondled her in front of other
employees, and even raped her sufficiently severe to constitute actionable sexual harass-
ment).
175. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (holding that English-only rules do not per se
create a hostile work environment).
176. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977); see also supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (discussing disparate treatment
analysis).
177. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. Eliminating disparate treatment of minorities
was Congress' particular goal in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. Few work-
place rules, however, are facially discriminatory today. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) ("As patently discriminatory practices become outlawed, those
employers bent on pursuing a general policy declared illegal by Congressional mandate
will undoubtedly devise more sophisticated methods to perpetuate discrimination among
employees."). Although employment discrimination has grown more subtle, disparate
treatment theory remains valid, and a plaintiff need only raise an inference of discrimina-
tion to establish a prima facie case. See id.; see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
In Rogers, the plaintiff argued that her employer, a group of optometrists, discriminated
against her by segregating its patients based on national origin. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at
236. Defendants claimed that the plaintiff, as an employee, was not treated differently
than other employees and therefore she had no right to allege discrimination. See id. at
238. The Fifth Circuit recognized, however, that the absence of intent does not excuse
unlawful discrimination against anyone, and "that petitioners' argument does not counte-
nance the distinct possibility that an employer's ... discrimination [with respect to its pa-
tients] may constitute a subtle scheme designed to create a working environment imbued
with discrimination and directed ultimately at minority group employees." Id. at 239.
Courts apply disparate treatment analysis primarily in examining employment decisions
based on subjective criteria such as interviews, rather than those based on objective crite-
ria like standardized tests, which are more amenable to disparate impact analysis. See
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As early as 1926, plaintiffs brought national origin discrimination
claims challenging employers' impermissible distinctions.1 7 Since the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts have applied disparate
treatment analysis and have found that an employer's presumption that
an employee could not perform on the job because of his national origin
was sufficient to establish the employer's intent to discriminate.179 If
courts applied disparate treatment to English-only cases in the same way
that they have applied it to other types of Title VII cases, they might find
that English-only rules discriminate against non-native English-speakers
on the basis of national origin.8
Disparate treatment theory may be even more applicable to English-
only claims than disparate impact theory because English-only rules ex-
clusively affect non-native English-speakers.' Under disparate impact
theory, plaintiffs must show that a facially neutral policy disadvantages a
particular protected group. 2 For example, while a general intelligence
test might function to exclude some white applicants, it might also ex-
clude black applicants in disproportionate numbers if blacks have tradi-
tionally received schooling inferior to whites.8 3 Similarly, while height or
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988) (contrasting the use of disparate
treatment theory-with the use of disparate impact theory).
178. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 508-09, 514 (1926) (striking down an
Internal Revenue provision prescribing that businesses keep books in English, Spanish, or
local dialect, because provision intentionally targeted Chinese merchants unable to speak
or understand such languages). Although Title VII was not enacted until 1964, courts ad-
judicated disparate treatment national origin discrimination claims much earlier. See it
179. See Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1993) (im-
plying that discriminatory remarks, combined with evidence that the employer relied on
an impermissible classification in an employment decision, may amount to disparate
treatment); Carino v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir.
1984) (finding that a university intentionally discriminated against a laboratory supervisor
based on national origin when it demoted him because of his foreign accent); Berke v.
Ohio Dep't. of Public Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (finding rea-
sonable the inference that, because plaintiff was of foreign national origin, references to
her accent, combined with good job performance, indicated that employer intentionally
discriminated against her based on her national origin when it denied her two positions).
180. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 294. Perea argues that courts should treat charac-
teristics closely related to protected classes just as they do the protected classes them-
selves. See id. He urges that as Congress views pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimi-
nation, the courts should view language discrimination as national origin discrimination.
See id.
181. See id. at 292-94 (advocating use of disparate treatment theory in connection with
English-only rules due to the close correlation between primary language and national
origin).
182. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15 (1977); see also supra notes 38-45 and accom-
panying text (explaining disparate impact analysis).
183. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (holding that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
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weight requirements might function to exclude some men, they might
also exclude women in disproportionate numbers.'4 English-only rules,
however, are simply not facially neutral.""
It would be disingenuous to argue that English-only rules do affect
some native English-speakers but not as drastically as they affect non-
native English-speakers.' 6 English-only rules are aimed specifically at
non-native English-speakers and are examples of disparate treatment.'8 7
The fact that English-only rules apply directly to non-native English-
speakers indicates intentional discrimination, regardless of the fact that
some non-native English-speakers also speak English.'m
IV. LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND ETHNICITY: THE INEXTRICABLE LINK
TO NATIONAL ORIGIN
Plaintiffs alleging that English-only rules discriminate on the basis of
national origin usually lose in court because courts have not recognized
the inextricable connection among national origin, language, culture, and
criminatory in operation").
184. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977) (holding that exclusion of
women in disproportionate numbers constitutes actionable discrimination on the basis of
sex). In Dothard, the Supreme Court acknowledged the discriminatory impact on women
when a prison's height requirement for correctional officers would exclude 33.29% of the
women who applied but only 1.28% of the men, and the weight requirement would ex-
clude 22.29% of the women who applied but only 2.35% of the men. See id
185. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 289-90 (pointing out that courts have not even
challenged the incorrect assumption that English-only policies are facially neutral).
186. See id. at 292 (explaining the adverse effect of English-only rules on all non-native
English speakers).
187. See id. at 290 ("An English-only rule will never have any adverse impact on per-
sons whose primary language is English."). The wording of the English-only rule at issue
in Spun Steak provides an excellent example. It specifically targeted Spanish-speakers by
announcing, in part: "During lunch, breaks, and employees' own time, they are obviously
free to speak Spanish if they wish. However, we urge all of you not to use your fluency in
Spanish in a fashion which may lead other employees to suffer humiliation." Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993). This rule was more of a "no-Spanish"
rule than an "English-only" rule. See id.; see also Califa, supra note 3, at 294 (asserting
that the English-only movement targets Hispanics in particular).
Although addressing accent discrimination and not English-only rules, one scholar ex-
plains that discrimination based on language is intentional. See Lippi-Green, supra note
164, at 165-66. She observes that people view accent as how "the other" speaks. Id. at 165
(providing examples of regional accents and the judgmental adjectives often used to de-
scribe them). The author claims that to be fair, when judging employer-employee com-
munication, courts should place more emphasis on the listener. See id. at 166, 184. The
reason for this, she asserts, is that prejudiced listeners inevitably will not understand
speakers with foreign accents because they do not wish to. See id at 166.
188. See Califa, supra note 3, at 294 (stating that although English-only rules appear
benign, they may be designed to target certain national origin groups).
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 47:1327
ethnicity.189 Plaintiffs could meet their initial burden more easily under
both disparate impact and disparate treatment analyses if courts were to
broaden their understanding of national origin to encompass ethnicity
and language."'
Comprehension by the courts of the effect of language restrictions on
non-native English-speakers would facilitate plaintiffs' disparate impact
arguments. 9' Appreciation of other cultures would guide the courts to
examine a particular rule's actual discriminatory effects and an em-
ployer's justifications, rather than a plaintiff's ability to comply with the
rules. 192 As for plaintiffs asserting disparate treatment, if courts better
understood the effect of English-only rules on non-native English-
speakers, they would recognize that English-only rules exclusively affect
189. See Perea II, supra note 15, at 807-08 (opining that courts have been unsympa-
thetic to discrimination claims of plaintiffs "whose ethnicity differs from that of the ma-
jority"). Perea cites with approval the EEOC's view that national origin inevitably deter-
mines ethnic traits. See id. at 830-31. Perea also discusses what he terms the "correlation
problem." See id. at 851. Just as ethnicity correlates closely enough to race to be pro-
tected under Title VII, Perea asserts that language and national origin are also inextricably
correlated because one's national origin almost always determines his primary language.
See id.
Perea points out that even if courts accept the correlation theory, however, several is-
sues remain in English-only cases. See id at 851-52. First, courts would still have discre-
tion with respect to which ethnic traits correlate acceptably with a protected class; thus,
courts could claim, as the Fifth Circuit did in Gloor, that language is independent of na-
tional origin. See id. at 852; see also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980).
Second, the correlation theory is subjective in that courts cannot easily define how closely
an ethnic trait must correlate with a protected class in order for it to function as a proxy.
See Perea II, supra note 15, at 852. Perea suggests basing protection on the ethnic traits
themselves, and not on national origin, because ethnic traits are more obvious to the ob-
server and thus more likely to be the actual basis for discrimination. See id. at 852-53. If
courts were to consider the ethnic trait as the classification, the correlation problem would
disappear. See id.; see also Cutler, supra note 2, at 1173-74 (arguing for a trait-based ap-
proach to national origin discrimination claims).
For a linguistic discussion on the cultural links among language, ethnicity, and national
origin, see generally NANCY FAIRES CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A HOST OF
TONGUES: LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983) (focusing on
American language communities and examining the implications of linguistic pluralism);
Dell H. Hymes, The Ethnography of Speaking, in READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
LANGUAGE 99 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1968) (discussing language and linguistics as an
anthropological tool); Matsuda, supra note 164 (focusing on foreign accent as an expres-
sion of culture).
190. See Perea II, supra note 15, at 826-27, 830 (finding courts' protection of national
origin minorities based on their ethnicity and language to be inadequate).
191. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 290-92 (discussing the impact of these rules on
non-native English speakers).
192. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (discussing the illogical nature of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's "ability to comply" test).
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a protected group."' Courts applying disparate treatment analysis would
therefore find that English-only rules, by their nature, treat groups dis-
parately; thus, the rules themselves should create an inference of dis-
crimination, as explained in the EEOC Guideline.'94
A. Disparate Impact Analysis: Recognizing the Link Between Language
and National Origin and Testing for Actual Adverse Impact
Title VII provides no interpretive language when it declares that em-
ployers may not discriminate on the basis of "national origin."' 95 The
EEOC, however, equates national origin discrimination with discrimina-
tion based on "physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national
origin group." 96 In analyzing English-only rules as national origin dis-
crimination, courts should apply the EEOC's broader definition. 97
Many legal, linguistic, and other scholars have emphasized the cultural
importance of language.'98 For example, one scholar equates national
origin with the expression of ethnicity, stating that a fundamental aspect
of ethnicity is primary language.' 99 He explains that sociologists and lin-
guists agree on the interdependence of language and ethnic identity.2°° In
193. Language in Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions proves that courts often do not
equate language with national origin. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 (stating that "[n]either
[Title VII] nor common understanding equates national origin with the language that one
chooses to speak"); cf Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) (re-
fusing to protect bilinguals who can "easily comply" with English-only rules).
194. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1997) (stating that the EEOC will presume that Eng-
lish-only rules violate Title VII).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1994) (outlawing national origin discrimination without
further explanation); see also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the
paucity of Title VII's legislative history regarding national origin).
196. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1997); see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (de-
scribing EEOC guidelines on national origin discrimination).
197. See Perea II, supra note 15, at 830-31 (arguing for the EEOC's broad interpreta-
tion of national origin). Indeed, Perea observes that given the Supreme Court's strict con-
struction of civil rights statutes, the solution to expanding the courts' view of national ori-
gin is to amend Title VII to include a provision outlawing discrimination based on ethnic
traits. See id. at 831.
198. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (citing both legal and linguistic schol-
ars discussing the connection between language and ethnic identity).
199. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 276 (arguing for this correlation, but acknowledg-
ing that social attitudes deny such a close correlation between language and ethnicity).
200. See id. at 276-78 (noting this concept and emphasizing that in American history,
language differences have provided a means for discriminating against cultural minorities).
Perea observes that Hispanic culture, for example, is apparent in the language of Spanish
speakers. See id. at 277-78; see also Joshua A. Fishman, The Sociology of Language: An
Interdisciplinary Social Science Approach to Language in Society, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 217, 251 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1971) (stating that Spanish
language, to those bilingual in Spanish and a second language, is associated specifically
135919981
Catholic University Law Review
addition, legal scholars have observed that language provides a means
for practicing national origin discrimination.f'
The fact that the plaintiffs in the cases decided by the Ninth Circuit
have been bilingual should not have affected the court's disparate impact
analysis.2 Bilingualism does not change the importance of ethnic iden-
tity, and bilingual employees suffer equally the psychological and socio-
logical effects of being prohibited from speaking their native language.
2°3
Disparate impact analysis is certainly appropriate with respect to Eng-
lish-only rules, as long as courts examine the actual impact of the rules on
those of foreign origin.4
B. Disparate Treatment Analysis: The Link Between Language and
National Origin and the Effect of English-Only Rules Solely on Non-
Native English-Speakers
Disparate treatment may be an equally appropriate analysis for Eng-
lish-only cases.2"5 English-only rules treat non-native English-speakers
negatively by their terms, and courts historically have analyzed such poli-
cies under disparate treatment theory.2"6 The adverse effect on employ-
with family and friendship).
201. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 277-78 (discussing discrimination as an "unhappy
consequence" of a culture's maintenance of a distinctive language). The Supreme Court
recognized the concept of language discrimination as a surrogate for national origin dis-
crimination in the context of peremptory challenges to jurors. See Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (plurality opinion). In that case, the petitioner argued that
the prosecutor had violated the Equal Protection Clause by excluding jurors based on
their ethnicity, inferred from their Spanish-speaking abilities. See id. at 355-57, 363. The
Court readily acknowledged the link between language and race or ethnicity. See id. at
371. At the same time, the Court recognized primary language as a tool for communicat-
ing with "precision and power," and for "defin[ing] the self." Id. at 363-64.
202. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 292 (explaining that primary language is central to
ethnic identity, regardless of how many languages a person speaks).
203. See id. One scholar explains that one must view bilinguals as people who have a
reason to be bilingual. See William F. Mackey, The Description of Bilingualism, in
READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 554-55 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1968). In
other words, bilingualism results only from contact between two monolingual societies,
because a self-sufficient bilingual community would be pointless. See id at 555. The
maintenance of two languages indicates that a bilingual person's ethnic identity never
completely disappears just because it assimilates. See id. at 557-68 (exploring the various
roles each language may play in a bilingual person's behavior).
204. Cf. Perea III, supra note 66, at 292-93 (explaining that English-only rules actually
have an adverse impact on all non-native English-speakers).
205. See id. at 293 (arguing that English-only rules exclusively impact people of foreign
origin).
206. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (explaining the use of disparate treatment analysis when an employment practice is
facially discriminatory).
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ees whose primary language is not English unquestionably implicates
those employees' right to be free from discrimination based on their na-
tional origin."'
Using disparate treatment theory to address employer actions exclu-
sively affecting one group would not be unprecedented.08 For example,
in order to permit continued application of Title VII in light of changing
social conditions, the courts, as well as the EEOC, have accepted plain-
tiffs' arguments that discrimination based on pregnancy constitutes dis-
crimination on the basis of sex."' Overruling the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in General Electric v. Gilbert, ° Congress amended Title VII in 1978
to include pregnancy as a prohibited basis for discrimination."' Congress
recognized the inextricable relationship between pregnancy and gender,
and thus expanded Title VII's protection to include protection of preg-
nancy, a trait uniquely held by women."
Similarly, the inextricable connection between national origin and lan-
guage demands that courts expand Title VII's protection to include non-
native English-speakers. 3 Changing times and increasing immigration
demand that the courts and Congress hear the voices of non-native Eng-
lish-speakers and provide for their protection in the workplace. 21 4 By
207. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 514-515, 528 (1926) (finding that a
law mandating the language in which merchants had to keep their books had an adverse
effect solely on Chinese merchants, denying them equal protection of the laws).
208. Cf. Helper, supra note 66, at 413-14 (pointing out that the Supreme Court recog-
nizes disparate treatment claims for Title VII protection of victims of sexual harassment as
victims of sex discrimination).
209. See id. at 413,419-21.
210. 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (holding that an employment benefit plan that dis-
criminated on the basis of pregnancy did not discriminate on the basis of sex so as to vio-
late Title VII).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). Title VII now provides, in pertinent part, that:
[tihe terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ...
Id.
212. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that the benefit
plan at issue discriminated against women by definition, in light of the fact that the capac-
ity to become pregnant distinguishes women from men).
213. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 279 (advocating Title VII coverage of language
discrimination due to the close tie between primary language and ethnicity).
214. See Perea II, supra note 15, at 809 (advocating a re-examination of Title VII's
adequacy in light of present demographic and ethnographic developments). Perea asserts
that Title VII jurisprudence dramatically misrepresents American demographics:
By the year 2000, non-whites, women and immigrants together will make up
more than five-sixths (eighty-three percent) of net additions to the workforce,
compared to fifty percent in 1987. Non-whites will make up almost twenty-nine
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changing the definition of national origin to incorporate language, the
courts would parallel for English-only plaintiffs the protection Congress
granted to pregnant women when it included pregnancy in the scope of
Title VII protection based on sex. 15 Plaintiffs could argue successfully
that English-only rules discriminate based on disparate treatment theory
if they asserted that language is so closely linked to national origin that
English-only rules exclusively affect non-native English-speakers.216
V. CONCLUSION
With rising levels of immigration in the United States, it is not sur-
prising that employers are instituting English-only rules in the workplace.
It is also not surprising that the employees affected by such rules have
sensed discriminatory animus underlying the rules and have brought
their complaints before the courts. The few judicial decisions, along with
misinterpreted guidance from the EEOC, evince a need for courts to un-
derstand better the nature of the discrimination at issue.
Courts must view English-only rules as they affect people whose pri-
mary language is not English. If courts grasp the logical links among lan-
guage, culture, ethnicity, and national origin, they will appreciate the na-
ture of the impact that factors into disparate impact analysis.
Alternatively, courts accepting the intertwined nature of language, cul-
ture, ethnicity, and national origin would comprehend that English-only
rules exclusively affect non-native English-speakers. Thus, the courts
could readily apply disparate treatment analysis. Regardless of the
analysis used in English-only cases, courts will succeed in protecting
plaintiffs' civil rights based on national origin only if they comprehend
the importance of language.
percent of new entrants into the labor force, twice their current share, between
now and 2000. White males will comprise only fifteen percent of new additions
during the same time period. Latinos will be America's largest minority group,
constituting approximately ten percent of the nation's labor force.
Id. (citations omitted). Just as the law recognizes women as a significant presence in the
workforce and thus protects them on the basis of pregnancy, a characteristic linked only to
women, so should the law protect language under the rubric of national origin, as people
of foreign national origin grow to hold a prominent place in the workforce. See Perea III,
supra note 66, at 293-94 (drawing the parallel between pregnancy and language in this con-
text).
215. See Perea III, supra note 66, at 293-94 (arguing that pregnancy is a protected
characteristic associated exclusively with women that parallels language as a characteristic
associated almost exclusively with foreign national origin).
216. See id. at 294 (stating that "Title VII requires treating characteristics that are
closely correlated with a protected characteristic the same as the explicitly protected char-
acteristic when such characteristics are used as the basis for discrimination that results in
an exclusive adverse effect upon a protected group.").
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